By Danny Nicol,
“The Trial of a Time Lord” (1986)
was a 14-part serial, the longest in Doctor
Who’s history. In it, the Doctor (Colin
Baker) is put on trial by his own people, the Time Lords, for interfering in
the affairs of other peoples and planets.
The trial is presided over by the Inquisitor (Lynda Bellingham) and the
Doctor is prosecuted by an official called as the Valeyard (Michael
Jayston).
Doc in the dock: the Doctor makes a point in his defence |
The trial provides the
opportunity to relate several of the Doctor’s adventures which the Valeyard
deploys as evidence of his guilt.
Professor James Chapman has criticised these various segments as
unengaging, and has condemned the over-arching narrative as inconsistent,
incoherent and poorly-structured (Inside
the Tardis: The Worlds of Doctor Who, 2nd edition, London : Tauris, 2013, pp.158-9). Be that as it may, this post focuses not on
the merits or demerits of the serial, but on the procedural shortcomings of the
trial.
The analysis does not purport to
be comprehensive. Indeed the procedural
deficiencies in “The Trial of a Time Lord” are so substantial as to merit a
major article in the field of Law and Television. Instead this post merely flags up a few of
the issues of procedure with which the narrative engages (and does so without giving
the game away about the plot’s moment of revelation).
A first issue in the trial is what
lawyers call public interest immunity.
This is the notion that certain information can be withheld from the
court in the public interest. When the
Doctor is on the planet Ravalox certain dialogue incriminating the Time Lords
is removed from the evidence. In 1968 in
Conway v Rimmer ([1968] AC 910) Britain’s
top court the House of Lords held that it was for the court - not the
government - to strike a balance between two
public interests involved: the public interest in withholding the information
versus the public interest in ensuring justice in the case. Here, the Inquisitor shows undue deference to
the Time Lords’ decision on suppressing the information: she does not really
interrogate the public interest in non-disclosure.
Impartial arbiter? The Inquisitor adjudicates |
A second issue is the
assumption that the Matrix cannot be challenged. The Matrix is the computer-based depository
of all Time Lord knowledge and experience.
When the Doctor insists that evidence from the Matrix has been
falsified, the Inquisitor pre-judges the issue, telling the Doctor “your
accusation would be laughable if it were not so outrageous”. The problem of certain
forms of evidence being considered unchallengable may have had resonance in the
mid 1980s when “The Trial of a Time Lord” was written. It was an era in which the evidence of the
British police, whilst often relied upon at trial, was becoming increasingly
discredited as miscarriages of justice mounted up. As a result the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984 ushered in the tape-recording of interviews. Such recordings now form the focus of a very
large number of criminal trials, as well as a long-standing trope in British television
crime drama.
A third issue is the
upgrading of the charge against the Doctor from interference to genocide. Late in the trial we learn that the Doctor
has destroyed an entire alien species, a race of sentient plants known as the
Vervoids. Instantly the Valeyard
insists that the capital charge of genocide be added to the charges against the
Doctor. Yet the rules of procedural fairness include
the right to adequate time to prepare one’s case (see for instance the ruling
of the High Court in R v Thames
Magistrates’ Court ex parte Polemis [1974] WLR 1371). To add new charges mid-trial would be an
outrageous breach of that principle.
The Valeyard presses for the ultimate sanction |
A fifth issue is the
rule against bias. It is a
vintage principle of common law that judges should be impartial vis-à-vis the
parties to a case (see e.g. Dimes v Grand Junction Canal I [1852] 10 ER 315). The principle has also been enshrined in Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Yet for all her gravitas, the Inquisitor eventually shows herself
far from impartial: she defends rather too vigorously the Time Lords’ decision
to extract the Doctor from time and space to face trial just as his companion,
Peri, needed rescuing from imminent destruction. Bias
in the opposite direction is apparent at the trial’s end: the Inquisitor drops
all charges against the Doctor because the Time Lords owe him a debt of gratitude
for having saved their skins. So much for the due process of law.
Eventually the Time Lords emerge
discredited from the trial because of their own constant interference in time
and space. It is Time Lord hypocrisy
which “The Trial of a Time Lord” ultimately condemns. But as a result the appalling lapses in
judicial procedure get sidelined. Yet
these deficiencies fall well short of the common law principle that it is not
enough for justice to be done, it must be manifestly be seen to be done – through compliance with the requirements of
procedural fairness. This raises the
important question of whether a conviction, however justified in substance,
should ever be lawfully obtained on the basis of an unfair procedure. The procedural corruption of the trial alone
justifies the Doctor’s stirring denunciation:
In all my
travellings throughout the universe, I have battled against evil, against
power-mad conspirators. I should have stayed HERE! The oldest civilization:
decadent, degenerate and rotten to the core! … Daleks, Sontarans, Cybermen -
they're still in the nursery compared to us! Ten million years of absolute
power - that's what it takes to be really corrupt!
the biggest problem being the production team had no real idea what they were doing!
ReplyDeleteNice to see a socialist on the same side as the Master! (Is Tony Blair going to grow one of those little beards?)
ReplyDelete